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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
James Wenke appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction. For his alleged
possession of approximately six and one-half ounces of marijuana, Mr. Wenke was sentenced to
40 years, with 20 years fixed, after he was found guilty of one count of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver and being a persistent violator.
In the course of the jury trial, Mr. Wenke’s right to due process was violated. First, the
district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to play a video of Mr. Wenke in jail
because the video was misleading, and its minimal probative value was substantially
outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice. Second, the district court failed to conduct a
proper analysis of the video prior to admitting it. Finally, the district court abused its discretion
when it allowed the State, through the testimony of one witness, to present evidence of
Mr. Wenke’s alleged prior bad acts.

These errors were not harmless.

Additionally, they

amounted to cumulative error, depriving him of his right to a fair trial.
Moreover, the prosecutor secured Mr. Wenke’s conviction only after committing
misconduct amounting to fundamental error at closing. The prosecutor committed misconduct
by, among other things, misstating the definition of reasonable doubt, appealing to the emotions,
passions, and prejudices of the jury, and misstating the evidence. This violated Mr. Wenke’s
right to due process.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In October of 2017, the State alleged Mr. Wenke had committed the crime of possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. (R., pp.12-13.) The complaint stemmed from
the discovery of 6.61 ounces of marijuana in a house that Jennifer Hickman rented. (R., pp.14-
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17.) The marijuana was found in the back bedroom of the house, which Ms. Hickman shared
with her roommate, Colbie Witte. (R., p.17.)
Officers discovered the marijuana after conducting a welfare check “on children in the
residence” because there were reports the children had been using drugs. (R., p.14.) The welfare
check was also conducted based on family members alleging there was a stolen motorcycle on
the property, and children had been found there under the influence. (R., pp.14-15.) One of the
officers who went to the house for the welfare check, Officer Mattson, also reported he had
“received information from Detective Bennett of the High Desert Task Force that his sources”
were telling him the residence was known for “active distribution, selling, and possession of
illegal Narcotics and that Hickman [was] selling narcotics.” (R., p.15.)
According to Officer Mattson’s probable cause affidavit, when the officers arrived at
Ms. Hickman’s residence, there was a smell of marijuana outside the house, which became
stronger when Ms. Hickman opened the door. (R., p.15.) Officer Mattson asked Ms. Hickman
who else was inside the house, and she said Ms. Witte and her five juvenile children. (R., p.15.)
He stated that she “failed to mention that James Wenke was in the back of the residence.”
(R., p.15.) Ms. Hickman testified at the trial that she had been romantically involved with
Mr. Wenke for approximately two weeks. (Tr., p.317, Ls.6-20.) When Officer Mattson asked
her why her house smelled of marijuana, Ms. Hickman said her son had been smoking a “blunt.”
(R., p.15.)
Ms. Hickman told the officers there was some marijuana on the living room table, and
Sergeant Coen asked her if they could look for other items, and she consented to them looking in
the living room. (R., p.15.) During that search, the officers found the marijuana on the table in
addition to a “white zipper case” with marijuana and an electronic smoking device inside,
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“bottles of an unknown fluid,” and “multiple balls of a green leafy plant substance which had the
odor of Marijuana.” (R., pp.15-16.) Ms. Hickman said the smoking device belonged to her, but
she had not seen it recently and denied owning the marijuana inside. (R., p.16.)
At that point, Officer Mattson detained Ms. Hickman and told her he would be applying
for a search warrant for the house. (R., p.16.) She said she would prefer to be detained at the
Payette Co. Sheriff’s office, so she could be out of handcuffs. (R., p.16.) Once she arrived at the
jail, however, officers discovered a bag of methamphetamine in her bra. (R., p.16.)
When the officers returned to the residence with the warrant, they discovered “a white
plastic bowl in Hickman’s and Witte’s closet” with 6.61 ounces of marijuana inside it.
(R., p.17.) In that same bedroom, they discovered a “grey zipper pouch” with approximately 40
clear plastic baggies with black spiders printed on them, and a “black digital scale with a white
crystal type residue.” (R., p.17.) Officer Mattson noted that the pattern on the baggies—
multiple small black spiders—matched that of the baggie of methamphetamine found on
Ms. Hickman at the jail. (R., p.17.)
Officer Mattson interviewed Ms. Witte at the jail, and reported that when he asked her
what she thought they found during the search, she said she assumed they found a large amount
of marijuana. (R., p.17.) When asked why she thought that, she said she and Ms. Hickman had
picked up Mr. Wenke in Oregon earlier in the day at his family’s marijuana farm, and he got into
the car with a drawstring bag that she thought had marijuana in it. (R., p.17.) She said the bag
had an “Oregon” logo on the side of it. (R., p.17.) The bag was later found in Ms. Hickman’s
vehicle. (Tr., p.198, Ls.13-17, p.203, Ls.1-14.)
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The magistrate held a preliminary hearing at which Officer Mattson, Ms. Hickman, and
Ms. Witte testified. 1 Officer Mattson testified that Mr. Wenke was in the house when the
officers arrived, and he saw Mr. Wenke come out of the bedroom where the marijuana was
subsequently discovered. (R., p.55 – Prelim. Tr., p.18, L.6 – p.21, L.23.) Ms. Hickman testified
that she picked Mr. Wenke up at his house in Ontario, Oregon, which she said was on a
marijuana farm, and took him back to her house in Payette. (R., p.59 – Prelim. Tr., p.35, Ls.624.) She said Mr. Wenke had a black bag with him when he got in her car. (R., p.59 – Prelim.
Tr., p.36, Ls.8-10.) She said she did not smell anything when Mr. Wenke got in the car, but,
when they returned to her residence, she could smell marijuana because Mr. Wenke was
allegedly drying marijuana that had been in the bag in an oven. (R., pp.59-60 – Prelim. Tr., p.36,
L.17 – p.38, L.13.) She said Mr. Wenke later told her that he had put the marijuana in a bowl in
the closet of the bedroom that she shared with Ms. Witte, and with Mr. Wenke when he was
staying there. (R., p.60 – Prelim. Tr., p.38, L.14 – p.39, L.12.)
Ms. Hickman also testified that she was not aware of Mr. Wenke dealing marijuana, but
she had seen him give some to people in Oregon, but not in Idaho. (R., p.60 – Prelim. Tr., p.39,
L.17 – p.40, L.2.)

On cross-examination, Ms. Hickman testified again that she brought

Mr. Wenke directly from his house in Oregon to her house. (R., p.61 – Prelim. Tr., p.42, Ls.821.) Ms. Hickman also testified that she was charged with two felonies based on her possession
of the methamphetamine and the marijuana, and that, in exchange for her testimony, the State
would “drop the felonies and re-file misdemeanors.” (R., p.63 – Prelim. Tr., p.49, L.20 – p.50,
L.7.)

1

The transcript of the preliminary hearing is attached to the Clerk’s Record. (R., pp.50-76.) It is
paginated, so citations will refer both to the record page number and the specific transcript page
number as there are four pages of transcript on each record page.
4

Unlike Ms. Hickman, Ms. Witte testified that she and Ms. Hickman had picked up
Mr. Wenke in Ontario, and then went gambling at the “Hog Rock in Ontario.” (R., p.65 –
Prelim. Tr., p.57, Ls.8-25.)

She also testified that they subsequently went to “Rusty’s in

Ontario” to gamble, before they returned to Ms. Hickman’s house. (R., p.65 – Prelim. Tr., p.59,
Ls.5-9.) She said when they returned to the house, Mr. Wenke was lifting weights, and some of
his weights were in the back bedroom, and some were outside. (R., p.65 – Prelim. Tr., p.59,
L.19 – p.60, L.8.) Ms. Witte also testified that she was charged with felony possession of
marijuana, but that the charge would be dismissed in exchange for her testimony. (R., p.68 –
Prelim. Tr., p.70, L.13 – p.71, L.8.)
After the hearing, Mr. Wenke was bound over to district court. (R., p.40.) He was
charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. (R., p.47.)
An Information Part II was later filed alleging that Mr. Wenke was a persistent violator.
(R., pp.78-79.)
Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent to use I.R.E. 404(b) evidence of
Mr. Wenke’s alleged “prior distribution activities” and his “prior conviction for distribution.”
(R., pp.89-123.)

With respect to his alleged prior distribution activities, the State said it

anticipated Ms. Hickman would testify that she had witnessed Mr. Wenke engage in “various
distribution activities.” (R., pp.91-92.) The State asserted the evidence was admissible for proof
of intent, preparation, common plan or scheme, and absence of mistake or accident. (R., p.93.)
The district court held a telephonic hearing on the I.R.E. 404(b) issue the day before the
trial. (See 1/22/18 Tr., generally.) 2 During that hearing, the parties also discussed Officer

2

Citations to the transcript from the telephonic hearing held the day before the trial began will
begin with “1/22/18 Tr.” Citations to the transcript from the two-day trial will begin with “Tr.”
as the pagination carries over from the first day to the second.
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Mattson’s two and one-half minute bodycam video of Mr. Wenke in jail, which the State wanted
to play for the jury; defense counsel objected to the video being played in its entirety given its
overly prejudicial nature. (1/22/18 Tr., p.35, L.22 – p.40, L.14.) But the district court later held
the State could play the video during trial without redaction. (Tr., p.149, Ls.2-4.)
The following day, the parties met before trial, and the district court denied the State’s
I.R.E. 404(b) motion in part. It held the State could not present evidence of a prior conviction,
but it required an additional hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether
Ms. Hickman’s and Ms. Witte’s testimony would be allowed. (Tr., p.9, L.2 – p.10, L.17.) After
hearing Ms. Hickman’s testimony outside the presence of the jury, the district court found that
she was generally not credible. (Tr., p.312, L.8 – p.313, L.20.) Nevertheless, the court held the
State could question her about her having previously seen Mr. Wenke dividing and weighing
marijuana. (Tr., p.313, Ls.2-5.)
At the trial, Mr. Wenke’s counsel said that Mr. Wenke worked as a trimmer at the
marijuana farm. (Tr., p.175, Ls.15-18.) The State later played Officer Mattson’s bodycam video
for the jury and played the audio portion again during closing argument. (Tr., p.230, L.19 –
p.232, L.12, p.474, L.25 – p.475, L.7.) Both Ms. Hickman and Ms. Witte testified for the State.
(Tr., p.314, L.15 – p.356, L.15, p.363, L.23 – p.398, L.17) Ms. Hickman testified that when she
picked up Mr. Wenke, he had a black bag with him.

(Tr., p.320, L.10 – p.321, L.14.)

Additionally, she testified that she had previously seen Mr. Wenke divide, weigh, and place
marijuana into baggies. (Tr., p.339, L.22 – p.340, L.8.) Mr. Wenke’s wife also testified and said
that she owned the black bag. (Tr., p.360, Ls.9-17.) Deputy Esquivel also testified that, when he
took Mr. Wenke to jail, he noticed a strong smell of marijuana. (Tr., p.420, L.18 – p.421, L.6.)
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Deputy Esquivel said that when he asked Mr. Wenke about it, he said he had been “trimming for
growers in Oregon.” (Tr., p.421, Ls.7-13.)
During closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to the jury using the
pronouns “we” and “us.” (Tr., p.463, L.10 – p.491, L.16.) He also said there had been no
testimony that Mr. Wenke was outside lifting weights after they returned to Ms. Hickman’s
house on the day in question, even though Ms. Witte had testified that he was. (Tr., p.394,
Ls.12-20, p.477, Ls.1-5.)

In that statement, he also said Ms. Hickman’s and Ms. Witte’s

testimony was “credible.” (Tr., p.477, Ls.1-3.)

He also said, “[W]hat constitutes reasonable

doubt, is so vague and shifting. It’s very really subjective when it comes down to it . . . .”
(Tr., p.489, Ls.10-12.)

“Subsequently, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts.

(R., pp.143-44.) The district court then imposed a sentence of 40 years, with 20 years fixed.
(R., p.208.)

Mr. Wenke timely appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction.

(R., pp.218-19.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted State’s Exhibit 8, the bodycam
video from Officer Mattson, without redaction, because the district court did not conduct
the proper balancing test, the video was misleading and irrelevant, and the video’s limited
probative value was substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed Ms. Hickman to testify that she
had previously seen Mr. Wenke divide up and weigh marijuana because the district
court’s finding that there was sufficient evidence to establish that alleged prior act as fact
was clearly erroneous?

III.

Did the State violate Mr. Wenke’s right to a fair trial by committing prosecutorial
misconduct amounting to fundamental error?

IV.

Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Wenke’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law violated because the accumulation of errors
deprived him of his right to a fair trial?

8

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted State’s Exhibit 8, The Bodycam
Video From Officer Mattson, Without Redaction, Because The District Court Did Not Conduct
The Proper Balancing Test, The Video Was Misleading And Irrelevant, And The Video’s
Limited Probative Value Was Substantially Outweighed By Its Unfairly Prejudicial Effect

A.

Introduction
The district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to play State’s Exhibit 8,

a video from the bodycam of Officer Mattson. The video showed Officer Mattson telling
Mr. Wenke that over a pound of marijuana had been found, and therefore Mr. Wenke would be
charged with trafficking. The amount of marijuana discovered was actually only 6.61 ounces—
less than half a pound—and Mr. Wenke was never charged with trafficking. The video also
showed Mr. Wenke behind bars swearing at Officer Mattson. Therefore, the video as played was
not only misleading and irrelevant, but any marginally probative value it had was substantially
outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial nature. However, the district court failed to evaluate the
probative value of the video or conduct the required balancing test between the probative value
and the prejudicial impact of the various parts of the video.

B.

Standard Of Review
The district court’s determination of whether the probative value of evidence is

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Baker, 161 Idaho 289, 297 (Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted). In reviewing a district court’s
exercise of discretion, the Court considers, “Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4)
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reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863
(2018). The relevancy of evidence is reviewed de novo. State v. Shutz, 143 Idaho 200, 202
(2006).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted State’s Exhibit 8, The
BodyCam Video From Officer Mattson, Because It Was Largely Irrelevant And
Misleading, And Its Limited Probative Value Was Substantially Outweighed By The
Danger Of Unfair Prejudice
At the telephonic hearing held the day before trial, the parties discussed Officer

Mattson’s bodycam video, and defense counsel objected to the video, noting that it showed
Mr. Wenke getting upset with Officer Mattson and swearing at him. (1/22/18 Tr., p.35, L.22 –
p.37, L.10.) The State argued that the video should be admitted because, at the very end of it,
Mr. Wenke asked Officer Mattson “where they found the black bag.” (1/22/18 Tr., p.36, Ls.1124.) Defense counsel requested that the video be redacted to include only that question from
Mr. Wenke. (1/22/18 Tr., p.37, Ls.1-12.) Defense counsel objected to the video being played in
its entirety because the other parts of it would do nothing but give the impression that Mr. Wenke
was a bad person who should be convicted. (1/22/18 Tr., p.37, Ls.1-10.)
The State claimed there were other relevant aspects of the video. For example, it said
Mr. Wenke’s reaction to Officer Mattson telling him they found “over a pound of marijuana,”
“suggests he knew what the right weight was.”3 (1/22/18 Tr., p.37, L.23 – p.38, L.7.) When the
district court asked how Mr. Wenke responded to Officer Mattson’s statement, the State said it

3

The prosecutor also said Mr. Wenke’s statement to Officer Mattson that he was not in the house
when the officers arrived was a lie and would be “used to kind of undermine his credibility.”
(1/22/18 Tr., p.38, L.21 – p.39, L.6.) He also argued that Mr. Wenke’s statement to Officer
Mattson that he was “in the back lifting weights,” and his statement that his weights were not in
the bedroom was a “false statement” that was relevant to establish “where the defendant at that
time contemporaneous with when this case occurred, where he said he was not, in fact, where he
was. (1/22/18 Tr., p.39, Ls.8-19.)
10

“wasn’t necessarily a verbal response” but rather “just a response of incredulity.” (1/22/18
Tr., p.38, Ls.8-17.) The State said, “It was just kind of a lot of half-spoken words of over a
pound and then just kind of some sounds and suggestions of just that that is not right.” (1/22/18
Tr., p.38, Ls.17-20; See Exhibit 8 at 0:20 – 1:10.)
The determination to admit or exclude relevant evidence is made by the trial court.
State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 6 (2013). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and the fact is of consequence in
determining the action. I.R.E. 401. “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . [or] misleading the jury
. . . .” I.R.E. 403. This requires a balancing test. The trial judge must gauge the probative worth
of the evidence by focusing on the “degree of relevance and materiality of the evidence, and the
need for it on the issue on which it is to be introduced.” Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107,
110 (1987). “To exclude evidence under Rule 403, the trial court must address whether the
probative value is substantially outweighed by one of the considerations listed in the Rule.”
State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471 (2010).

“First, the trial court must determine that

the evidence is relevant under I.R.E. 401; and, second, the court must determine that
the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.” State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 822 (Ct. App. 2009).
The district court, however, held the video was admissible without conducting a
balancing test and without assessing the video’s probative worth. The court simply stated, “I
find that it’s relevant, and I don’t find that it is unfairly prejudicial, so I will allow the State to
use that CD.” (Tr., p.149, Ls.2-4 (emphasis added).) The district court said nothing about why
the video was relevant, what parts of it were relevant, and most importantly failed to analyze the
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probative value of those parts. The State later played the entire video for the jury during the trial,
and it replayed the audio during its closing argument. (Tr., p.232, Ls.5-15, p.474, L.14 – p.475,
L.7.)
The district court abused its discretion because it did not act consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the choice before it, and it did not reach its decision to allow the State to
play the entire video through an exercise of reason. First, the portion of the video in which
Officer Mattson says he found “over a pound of marijuana” and therefore Mr. Wenke would be
charged with trafficking is not relevant because less than half a pound of marijuana was
discovered, and Mr. Wenke was never charged with trafficking. Not only is that portion of the
video not probative of anything at issue before the jury, it is highly misleading.
Moreover, Mr. Wenke’s reaction to Officer Mattson’s statement had no tendency to make
his possession of the marijuana discovered in the closet more or less probable than it would be
without that portion of the video. Indeed, it was just as likely that Mr. Wenke responded with
“incredulity” because he was surprised to learn that any amount of marijuana was discovered, let
alone that he was being held responsible for it and being charged with trafficking. An innocent
person would have the same reaction. Thus, the State was essentially arguing that if a person is
incredulous over a false accusation, that incredulity proves guilt. This is absurd. Mr. Wenke’s
reaction to Officer Mattson’s statements was not relevant, and it was not probative.
More importantly, however, the video as played was unfairly prejudicial and misleading.
The jury was of course told how much marijuana was found in the bowl in the closet. (Tr., p.226,
Ls.3-5), but to hear from a law enforcement officer that it was “over a pound” was inherently
prejudicial. It is common sense that “over a pound” sounds more serious to jurors than six
ounces. The statement was also misleading because it was completely inaccurate. Certainly,
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wholly inaccurate statements are misleading and confusing for the jury. The statement was also
misleading and prejudicial because Officer Mattson told Mr. Wenke he was going to be charged
with trafficking. Again, to a layperson, trafficking likely sounds like a more serious offense than
possession.

Further, such a statement could make the jury think that more evidence was

originally discovered that was, for some reason, not disclosed to them.
The video was also unfairly prejudicial because it showed Mr. Wenke behind bars
swearing at Officer Mattson. The jury seeing a defendant behind bars clearly has a similar effect
to presenting the defendant in restraints before the jury in that it may affect the presumption of
innocence and thus the outcome of the trial. See e.g. State v. Wright, 153 Idaho 478, 487 (2012).
There was simply no probative value to some portions of the video. As such, the district court
abused its discretion in admitting State’s Exhibit 8 without redaction because it failed to conduct
the required balancing test, and the probative value of parts of the video, if any, was substantially
outweighed by their unfairly prejudicial effect. That prejudicial effect was reinforced when the
State played the audio of the recording again at closing.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed Ms. Hickman To Testify That She
Had Previously Seen Mr. Wenke Divide Up And Weigh Marijuana Because The District Court’s
Finding That There Was Sufficient Evidence To Establish That Alleged Prior Act As Fact Was
Clearly Erroneous
A.

Introduction
The district court abused its discretion in admitting impermissible Idaho Rule of

Evidence 404(b) evidence through Ms. Hickman’s testimony. Specifically, the district court
allowed Ms. Hickman to testify that she had seen Mr. Wenke divide up and weigh marijuana
before. The district court allowed this testimony despite finding that Ms. Hickman was not
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credible to testify as to “any” of Mr. Wenke’s alleged prior acts of delivery or distribution
because her testimony on the issue was completely different at the preliminary hearing.
Therefore, the district court did not reach its decision to allow Ms. Hickman to testify about
Mr. Wenke’s prior acts through an exercise of reason; its determination that her testimony was
sufficient to establish the act as fact was not supported by substantial and competent evidence
and was therefore clearly erroneous.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a lower

court’s decision to either admit or exclude evidence. White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888 (2004).
In reviewing a district court’s exercise of discretion, the Court considers, “Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries
of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun
Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
As with findings of fact, when reviewing a district court’s credibility determination,
Idaho appellate courts apply a clearly erroneous standard.

A district court’s credibility

determination is clearly erroneous if not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009).

C.

The District Court’s Findings Regarding Ms. Hickman’s Lack Of Credibility As To
Witnessing Any Prior Acts Of Distribution Showed There Was Also Insufficient
Evidence To Establish As Fact That Ms. Hickman Had Witnessed Mr. Wenke Divide Up
And Weigh Marijuana
Prior to trial, the State filed a Motion in Limine requesting a pretrial ruling on the

admissibility of I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (R., pp.89-123.) In relevant part, the State sought to
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introduce testimony from Ms. Hickman that “she witnessed him engage in various distribution
activities.” (R., pp.91-92.) The State asserted the evidence was admissible for proof of intent,
preparation, common plan or scheme, and absence of mistake or accident. (R., p.93.)
“Under I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to show
a defendant’s criminal propensity.” State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010). “It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,” if the prosecution has
provided notice that it intends to produce the evidence. Id.
In determining whether to admit I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, a trial court employs a two-step
analysis. “First, the trial court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish
the other crime or wrong as fact.” State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009). “The trial court must
also determine whether the fact of another crime or wrong, if established, would be relevant.
Evidence of uncharged misconduct must be relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning
the crime charged, other than propensity. Such evidence is only relevant if the jury can
reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.” Id. “Second,
the trial court must engage in a balancing under I.R.E. 403 and determine whether the danger of
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.” Id.
At the hearing on the I.R.E. 404(b) motion, the State said Ms. Hickman would testify that
she had “witnessed [Mr. Wenke] engage in various activities of distribution, some of which she
actually participated in.” (1/22/18 Tr., p.13, L.25 – p.14, L.5.) Defense counsel argued that any
such testimony would conflict with her testimony at the preliminary hearing. (1/22/18 Tr., p.21,
Ls.16 – p.22, L.14.) He pointed out that, at the preliminary hearing, Ms. Hickman confirmed
that she was not aware of Mr. Wenke dealing marijuana, and she had never witnessed him sell it
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to anybody.

(1/22/18 Tr., p.21, L.21 – p.22, L.4.)

Defense counsel also argued that

Ms. Hickman testified at the preliminary hearing that she had seen Mr. Wenke give people
marijuana in Oregon, but she had never seen him do that in Idaho. (1/22/18 Tr., p.22, Ls.4-11.)
As such, defense counsel argued there was not sufficient evidence to establish the acts as fact.
(1/22/18 Tr., p.22, L.14 – p.23, L.2.)
The district court said it would hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury before
ruling on the issue. (Tr., p.8, L.22 – p.9, L.10.) At that hearing, Ms. Hickman testified that she
picked up Mr. Wenke at “Winners” restaurant in Ontario on the day in question. (Tr., p.291,
Ls.5-9.) She also testified she had seen Mr. Wenke “drop off” marijuana to somebody in Ontario
and “front” some marijuana to someone at her house in Idaho. (Tr., p.297, L.10 – p.300, L.8.)
Additionally, she testified that she had twice seen Mr. Wenke divide and weigh marijuana that he
brought from Ontario and place it in Ziploc bags. (Tr., p.301, L.15 – p.302, L.25.)
During cross-examination, however, Ms. Hickman testified that she lied at the
preliminary hearing when she said she had never seen Mr. Wenke give or sell marijuana to
anyone in Idaho. (Tr., p.304, L.16 – p.306, L.10.) Additionally, when confronted with the fact
that she said she picked up Mr. Wenke up at his family farm during the preliminary hearing, she
said she did not “recall saying that.” (Tr., p.306, Ls.12-25.)
Based on Ms. Hickman’s conflicting testimony, the district court acknowledged that it
needed to determine “whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong
as fact.” (Tr., p.312, Ls.9-11.) It then stated that it did not “find her testimony credible
regarding any prior incidents of delivery or distribution.” (Tr., p.312, Ls.12-14.) It also stated,
“Her testimony is contradictory to Ms. Witte’s in terms of picking up, dropping off the
defendant, which bag he had when they picked him up. She did testify completely differently in
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terms of whether she had ever witnessed him giving people any marijuana in Idaho. She said no
at the preliminary hearing. And her testimony today doesn’t convince me that that is accurate.”
(Trial Tr., p.312, Ls.16-23.) The court then held it would not “allow evidence of the prior
incidents in terms of delivery or distribution of marijuana.” (Trial Tr., p.312, L.24 – p.313, L.1.)
However, despite Ms. Hickman’s contradictory and confused testimony, the district court
said it would allow the State to “get into” her claim that she had seen Mr. Wenke “divide that
marijuana up before.” (Tr., p.313, Ls.2-5.) But when the State asked for clarification of the
relevant standard, the district court said, “I have to determine whether there is sufficient
evidence. And part of that is credibility. And I don’t find her to be credible. I don’t find her
testimony to be credible.” (Trial Tr., p.313, Ls.6-20.)
The district court’s implicit finding that there was sufficient evidence to establish as fact
that Ms. Hickman had previously seen Mr. Wenke divide up and weigh marijuana despite
finding her not credible on “any prior incidents of delivery or distribution” was clearly erroneous
as it was not supported by substantial and competent evidence.

Indeed, the finding was

disproved by the district court’s statements about Ms. Hickman’s conflicting testimony regarding
all the other prior acts she allegedly witnessed, and its ultimate finding that it did not find her
credible. Further, the alleged acts of previously selling or giving marijuana to anyone in Idaho,
which the district court did not allow, were inextricably intertwined with the alleged act of
dividing it up. In other words, dividing and weighing marijuana is likely done only if one
intends to give away, sell, or otherwise distribute marijuana, which is indeed its only possible
probative value. Ms. Hickman was not asked whether she had seen Mr. Wenke divide up and
weigh marijuana in Idaho at the preliminary hearing. Presumably, if she was asked, she would
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have said no because she testified there that she had never seen Mr. Wenke give or sell marijuana
to anyone in Idaho. Thus, such testimony would ultimately go to the same act.
Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it allowed Ms. Hickman to testify
that she had seen Mr. Wenke divide and weigh marijuana in Idaho before because it did not
reach its decision that there was sufficient evidence to establish that prior act as fact, through an
exercise of reason.

III.
The State Violated Mr. Wenke’s Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial Misconduct
Amounting To Fundamental Error

A.

Introduction
The prosecutor in this case committed misconduct by presenting a closing argument that

was replete with impermissible statements and therefore denied Mr. Wenke a fair trial. In his
closing argument, the prosecutor misstated the definition of reasonable doubt; he
mischaracterized the evidence while expressing his personal belief as to the credibility of
witnesses; and he improperly aligned himself with the jury, impermissibly appealing to their
emotions, passions, and prejudice.
constitutional rights.

All of these instances violated Mr. Wenke’s unwaived

Therefore, this Court should remand for a new trial after vacating

Mr. Wenke’s convictions.

B.

Standard Of Review
Because Mr. Wenke’s prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in constitutional

principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises free review. State v.
Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361 (2013). Although no objection to the prosecutor’s misconduct was
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made in the district court, Mr. Wenke’s claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct is
reviewable under the fundamental error doctrine. A defendant can prove fundamental error if he
shows that the error: “(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights;
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and
(3) was not harmless.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010). To show the error was not
harmless, the defendant has “the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error
affected the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 226.

C.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Amounting To Fundamental Error By
Misrepresenting The Reasonable Doubt Burden, Appealing To The Passions And
Prejudices Of The Jury, And Misstating The Evidence While Improperly Vouching For
The Credibility Of The Witnesses
The U.S. and Idaho Constitutions provide that no person can be “deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; ID. CONST. art. I, § 13.
Due process requires that criminal trials are fundamentally fair. Schwartzmiller v. Winters,
99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial misconduct may so unfairly contaminate a trial that the
resulting conviction is a denial of due process. State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App.
2005) (citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987)). Indeed, this Court has long held that
prosecutors must be ever vigilant in not obtaining convictions by violating a defendant’s rights:
“Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that they
occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their
statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they
will give to counsel for the accused.” State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct. App. 2007)
(quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44 (1903)). And, as the Irwin Court recognized, “It seems
that they frequently exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge
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of error, and generally in so doing they transgress upon the rights of the accused.” Id. Thus, if
“a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury
instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be
drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.”
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. Here, the prosecutor relied on factors other than the applicable law and
the facts adduced at trial and thus violated Mr. Wenke’s due process right to a fair trial.

1.

It Was Misconduct To Misrepresent The Reasonable Doubt Burden

In this case, the prosecutor misrepresented the reasonable doubt burden. Idaho law is
well-settled that this is impermissible. “A closing argument may not misrepresent . . . the law or
the reasonable doubt burden.” Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86 (citing State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho
758, 769 (1993)).

“Misconduct may occur by the prosecutor diminishing or distorting the

state’s burden to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Felder, 150
Idaho 269, 274 (Ct. App. 2010). That is precisely what the prosecutor did here. He said,
“[W]hat constitutes reasonable doubt, is so vague and shifting. It’s very really subjective when it
comes down to it, but I think [it] may be illustrated one way. This puzzle is missing two letters,
same letters, but it’s missing two letters. Do you have any doubt in your mind any reasonable
alternative as to what that says? The answer is no. It’s beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Tr., p.489,
Ls.10-18.) The district court gave the jury the definition of reasonable doubt before the trial
started. (Tr., p.157, Ls.18-22.) However, the prosecutor misrepresented the reasonable doubt
burden by saying that reasonable doubt was “vague and shifting” and “subjective.”
This misconduct violated Mr. Wenke’s unwaived constitutional right to a fair trial. “The
requirement that the State prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is grounded
in the constitutional guarantee of due process.” Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
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313-14 (1979); State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942 (2008); State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679,
685 (Ct. App. 2010)).
The error here is clear from the record without the need for additional information. And
it is readily apparent that defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s statement was not
a tactical decision.

Indeed, there was no reasonable strategic basis not to object to such

misconduct other than ignorance of the law, which is “not a tactical decision.” State v. Parton,
154 Idaho 558, 568 (2013).
Finally, the misconduct was not harmless as the reasonable doubt standard “plays a vital
role in the American scheme of criminal procedure because it provides concrete substance for the
presumption of innocence—that bedrock axiomatic and elementary principle whose enforcement
lies at the foundation of the administration of criminal law.” Felder, 150 Idaho at 274 (citing
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970); Erickson, 148 Idaho at 685.)

Indeed, given the

importance of the reasonable doubt standard, there is at least a reasonable possibility that the
prosecutor’s misrepresentation of that standard affected the outcome of the trial because
characterizing it as “subjective,” “vague,” and “shifting” diminished the importance of the
required reasonableness of any doubt and allowed the jury to view any doubt as reasonable.
Additionally, there was a great deal of evidence presented indicating that Ms. Hickman
was actually the person dealing drugs. First, the original purpose of the welfare check was in
part due to the fact that Ms. Hickman’s residence was known for “active distribution, selling, and
possession of illegal Narcotics and that Hickman [was] selling narcotics.” (R., p.15.) Second,
the baggie of methamphetamine discovered on Ms. Hickman at the jail matched the baggies
found in the home. (R., p.17; Tr., p.235, L.8 - p.236, L.12.) And Ms. Hickman testified that
those baggies were there before Mr. Wenke started coming to her house. (Tr., p.350, Ls.3-9.)
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Ms. Witte also testified that she had used the baggies when she was “personally using.”
(Tr., p.387, Ls.13-25.) Third, when Ms. Hickman was pulled over five days later, officers
discovered over an ounce of marijuana in her car, which she again claimed belonged to someone
else. (Tr., p.253, L.4 – p.255, L.1.) And fourth, there was a plethora of other marijuana,
paraphernalia, and baggies discovered in the house. (See R., p.88.) In his initial incident report,
with the exception of one pipe and the 6.61 ounces of marijuana, Officer Mattson listed the
property owners of those other items as Ms. Hickman, Ms. Hickman’s children, and Ms. Witte.
(Tr., p.244, L.5 – p.257, L.20.) Indeed, neither of the two digital scales discovered were
attributed to Mr. Wenke. Therefore, there was a reasonable possibility that all this evidence
would cause the jury to have reasonable doubt, and there was a reasonable possibility that the
prosecutor’s misleading statements on the State’s burden allowed the jury to overlook that doubt.

2.

It Was Misconduct To Misstate The Evidence And Improperly Vouch For The
Credibility Of Witnesses

“It is improper . . . for the prosecution to express a personal belief as to the credibility of
witnesses, unless the comment is based solely on inferences from evidence presented at trial.”
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003).
Here, the prosecutor stated, “We have credible testimony, not only from Colbie Witte and
Jennifer Hickman, but also Officer Mattson that in the room that he was staying in there were
weights. And that he used those weights in that room. Sure. There’s also testimony that he used
them outside. None that he used them outside on this day.” (Tr., p.477, Ls.1-5 (emphasis
added).) This was a reference to Mr. Wenke’s comment in State’s Exhibit 8, Officer Mattson’s
bodycam video, that he was outside when the police arrived, and the weights in the bedroom
were not his. (State’s Exhibit 8 at 1:30 – 2:00.) There are two problems with the statement.
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First, the prosecutor stated that the witnesses were credible, and this is impermissible. Second,
his statement that there had been no contradictory testimony was not true. Ms. Witte testified
that Mr. Wenke did use his weights outside on that day, after they returned to the house.
(Tr., p.394, Ls.12-20.)
Therefore, the prosecutor’s statement violated Mr. Wenke’s right to a fair trial and due
process of law. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (recognizing that
where prosecutorial misconduct does not directly infringe upon rights specifically guaranteed by
the Constitution (such as the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination), it
may violate the Constitution by rendering the defendant’s trial unfair). Indeed, the credibility of
Ms. Hickman and Ms. Witte was a serious issue in the case. (See Tr., p.312, L.8 – p.313, L.20.)
They also both admitted that they lied at the preliminary hearing. (Tr., p.305, L.12 – p.306, L.2,
p.344, Ls.6-16, p.393, L.16 – p.394, L.10.) Further, they both admitted that they were under the
influence of methamphetamine on the day in question. (Tr., p.341, Ls.8-14, p.393, L.16 – p.394,
L.10.) Moreover, the district court itself found that their testimony was accomplice testimony.
(Tr., p.445, Ls.18-23.) Thus, the State’s vouching for their credibility and misstating Ms. Witte’s
testimony was highly prejudicial to Mr. Wenke’s defense as the prosecutor’s opinion of these
witnesses likely erased any doubts the jury may have had regarding the testimony of these
witnesses.
The error here is also clear from the record. Further, there was no reasonable tactical or
strategic reason not to object to such a blatant comment on the witnesses’ credibility and
misstatement of the evidence.

Finally, given the important role that Ms. Hickman’s and

Ms. Witte’s testimony played in the State’s attempts to establish both Mr. Wenke’s possession
and his intent to distribute, as well as the evidence presented that implicated Ms. Hickman, as
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discussed above in Section 1, there was at least a reasonable possibility that these statements
affected the outcome of the trial.

3.

It Was Misconduct For The Prosecutor To Appeal To The Passions And
Prejudices Of The Jury By Improperly Aligning Himself With The Jury

It is misconduct for the prosecutor to appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jury.
See State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 502 (2017) (stating that “the prosecutor has a duty to avoid
misrepresentation of the facts and unnecessarily inflammatory tactics”); Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87
(“appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics are
impermissible”).
Here, the prosecutor committed misconduct by repeatedly using the pronouns “we” and
“us” when referring to the jury. By doing so, he improperly aligned himself with the jury, which
appealed to the passions and prejudice of the jury. See e.g., State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776
(Minn. 2006). In Mayhorn, the prosecutor said to the jury, “This is kind of foreign to all of us, I
believe, because we’re not really accustomed to this drug world and drug dealing.” Id. at 789.
The court stated, “Even to the extent it is permissible to describe a ‘drug world’ of which the jury
is not a part, it does not follow that a prosecutor may describe herself and the jury as a group of
which the defendant is not a part.” Id. at 790. It went on to state, “On a more basic level, a
prosecutor is not a member of the jury, so to use ‘we’ and ‘us’ is inappropriate and may be an
effort to appeal to the jury's passions. We conclude that the prosecutor committed misconduct
when she attacked Mayhorn’s character and aligned herself with the jury.” Id. But see Nunn v.
State, 753 N.W.2d 657, 662-63 (2008) (where the prosecutor said “we learned” six times, the
court held the prosecutor’s use of “we” was not misconduct because it “could reasonably be
interpreted in this context to refer to everybody who was in court when the evidence was
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presented.”) Notably, the Tenth Circuit has also stated, “To the extent that the prosecutor’s
argument portrayed the jury as part of a team opposing the defendant, it was improper.”
Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1238 (10th Cir. 1986).
In this case, at some points in his closing argument, the prosecutor properly referred to
the jury as “you.” For example, he said, “[I]t’s a very important job that you guys have today,
whether there’s any reasonable alternative explanation for the set of facts you received.”
(Tr., p.462, Ls.7-9.) However, at many other points during closing, he used the pronouns “we”
and “us” when referring to the jury.

While some of those occurrences referred to what

“everybody in court” had learned from the evidence presented, as in Nunn, too many of them did
not. For example, the prosecutor said, “It’s common sense that helps us tie the bag in this case
to Mr. Wenke. It’s common sense that tells us that there was marijuana in that bag. Common
sense that tells us that the amount of marijuana based on the testimony, based on the evidence,
was a pretty significant amount.” (Tr., p.463, Ls.10-14.) This is not merely reviewing the
evidence everyone heard; this is joining the jury in the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. That
is the prosecutor aligning himself with the jury.
Additionally, the ongoing references to “we,” “us,” and “our” were made more
problematic because the prosecutor used them interchangeably, sometimes properly using them
to refer to the State—“So let’s go through what we had to prove.” (Tr., p.463, L.25)—and
sometimes improperly using them to refer to the State and the jury—“Now, I want to break this
down, because you heard that as the judge gave it and it can kind of go right over our heads.”
(Tr., p.465, Ls.1-3 (emphasis added).) This repetitive, interchangeable use also had the effect of
aligning the jury with the State.
Additionally, after stating again that “common sense can tell us a lot” and playing the
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audio of Exhibit 8 again (Tr., p.474, L.16 – p.475, L.7), the prosecutor, in reviewing
Mr. Wenke’s reaction to being told by Officer Mattson that over a pound of marijuana was
discovered, said, “What does that tell us, Ladies and Gentlemen?” (Tr., p.475, Ls.8-22.) He
went on to say, “I think our common sense can tell us what maybe the next statement maybe he
wanted to make was, no, it was six ounces.” (Tr., p.476, Ls.4-5.) Not only does that phrasing
align the jury with the State, but asking the jury to consider an imaginary statement is asking the
jury to consider facts not in evidence. “A closing argument may not . . . refer to facts not in
evidence.” Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86 (citing State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166 (1980)).
Additionally, when discussing the black bag that was found and attributed to Mr. Wenke,
the prosecutor said, “This is the one I think the most can be drawn from. We can draw the most
from this with our common sense. We can look at that and go . . . .” (Tr., p.477, Ls.8-11.)
Later, he started using “your,” “you,” “us,” and “our” in the same sentences. He said, “Again,
what does your common sense tell us. That tells us that that’s the defendant’s bag.” (Tr., p.478,
Ls.8-9.) Likewise, he said, “And again, you heard the testimony of pot remnants in the bag, and
we can conclude from our common sense that that was the bag . . . .” (Tr., p.478, Ls.12-14.)
With respect to preparation, the prosecutor said, “What does preparation tell us? It tells
us he intended to do something with that marijuana.” (Tr., p.479, Ls.7-9.) When talking to the
jury about the “credibility of some witnesses,” the prosecutor said, “And we know he got back to
Idaho. We know from Ms. Hickman and Ms. Witte that they were the ones that picked him up
and that’s how they got back.” (Tr., p.482, Ls.7-9.) In that instance, the prosecutor was
describing what the jury learned.

However, soon after that, he said, “Let’s talk about

Ms. Hickman,” and he went on to say, “Possibility of us re-filing felonies on her . . . We are
going to re-file the felonies . . . .” (Tr., p.482, L.12 – p.483, L.7.) As such, within moments, the
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prosecutor used “we” to refer to both the jury and the State. This had the effect of aligning the
jury with the State and thus appealing to the passions and prejudice of the jury.
This misconduct violated Mr. Wenke’s rights to due process of law and a fair trial. See
Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643. The repetitive nature of the prosecutor’s statements throughout
closing showed that the prosecutor was engaging in a pattern designed to appeal to the passions
and prejudice of the jury. This was highly prejudicial and deprived Mr. Wenke of his right to a
fair trial and due process of law.
That pattern is also clear from the record. And there is no reasonable strategic or tactical
basis for defense counsel not to object to such misconduct. Indeed, there is nothing to be gained
from allowing a prosecutor to engage in this misconduct. As such, the error here is plain.
Finally, given the pervasive nature of the misconduct, there is also a reasonable
possibility that the pattern affected the outcome of Mr. Wenke’s trial because by the end of the
prosecutor’s closing argument, the jury may have felt compelled to render a guilty verdict not
based solely on the evidence—much of which actually implicated Ms. Hickman as discussed
above in Section 1—but based in part on the State’s improper appeal to its passions and
prejudices.

IV.
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Wenke’s Fourteenth Amendment
Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of Errors Deprived
Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial
Mr. Wenke asserts that if the Court finds that the above errors were harmless, the district
court’s errors combined amount to cumulative error. The cumulative error doctrine refers to an
accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated,
show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant’s constitutional right to due
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process. State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002). Under that doctrine, even when
individual errors are deemed harmless, an accumulation of such errors may deprive a defendant
of a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994). This Court can find cumulative
error if it concludes there is merit to more than one of the alleged errors and then concludes that
these errors, when aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160,
171 (Ct. App. 1999). The above errors, when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in
contravention of Mr. Wenke’s rights.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Wenke respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand this case to the district court for a new trial.
DATED this 9th day of January, 2019.
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